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It is a great pleasure to be back at the Naval War College and an extraordinaryhonor to be opening this conference. As I look out, I see colleagues of long
standing. More important than that, although that fact is important, I see col-
leagues who have been my teachers as I have pursued my own work.
The annual International Law Department conferences famously address the
most difficult and contentious topics in the field known variously as the law of
armed conflict, laws of war and international humanitarian law (IHL). (While I re-
gard these terms as coextensive, not everyone does, which itself is a source of con-
fusion and controversy.) The coverage of this conference is equally broad and
challenging: detention, civilianization of warfighting, the meaning of “direct par-
ticipation in hostilities,” the impact of drones, asymmetric warfare, and issues of
enforcement and accountability. I imagine discussion also will touch on embar-
goes and blockades. These topics are of operational, not just academic, interest.
Participants here are well known for taking real-world concerns into account. This
fact alone sets the conference apart.
* Former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, US Naval War College. The views
expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the US government or any other
entity with which I am or have been associated.
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The themes to be examined over the next few days highlight different perspec-
tives within the legal and political communities worldwide. While Americans may
have fewer difficulties with seeing terrorists in the context of armed conflict than
Europeans and others, this phenomenon is only a shorthand way of referring to
differences of view that are of legal, political and social significance. At a conference
in England recently, a US official was surprised to discover that the health of the In-
ternational Criminal Court was the thermometer for gauging the health of the en-
tire international legal system.
I thought therefore to begin our conference with some thoughts about the UN
Human Rights Council Report, dated May 28, 2010, of Professor Philip Alston of
the New York University School of Law on “extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions,” including “targeted killings.”1 It merits attention because the subject
is at the center of debate about the lawful use of lethal force against terrorists and
those who support, harbor, direct or finance them. It takes us back to September
2001 and the rejection of a law enforcement–only—or mainly law enforcement—
approach to combating terrorism.
Alston’s approach raises a number of questions and highlights a number of is-
sues. I shall therefore begin with a summary of the argument and then note some
questions about its assumptions and conclusions.
The Alston Report
Legal questions in armed conflict turn most often on the weapon chosen, the target
and collateral damage. Lately, the extent and definition of the battlefield, particu-
larly when combating terrorists, also are issues for analysis and debate. In addition,
as a result of the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Israeli
“wall,”2 whether or not a State has a right of self-defense under international law
against attacks—either planned or executed—by terrorist groups, that is, non-
State actors, continues to concern policymakers and commentators alike. To begin, I
should make clear my views on this issue: terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and
others are engaged in hostilities with the United States and other States even
though they are not themselves States. States from which they operate have an obli-
gation under international law, whether customary or derived from binding UN
Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1373 (2001),3 or treaties, to pre-
vent terrorist groups from engaging in attacks and to put a stop to active and pas-
sive support for terrorism. When a State is unable to carry out this duty, the State
suffering attack is not without recourse, including an inherent right to use force if
necessary and proportionate in self-defense. The necessity requirement is hardly
trivial. Nor is the proportionality requirement: that quantum of force reasonably
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necessary to bring an end to the condition giving rise to the right to use force in
self-defense in the first instance. The use of force must conform to requirements in
the law of armed conflict as well.4
Alston’s Report has stimulated much interest because it addresses subjects of
current concern. He begins by focusing on unmanned aerial vehicles and weapons
fired from them as among the most controversial instruments in the conflict with
terrorists. He asserts that “a missile fired from a drone is no different from any
other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or
gunship that fires missiles. The critical legal question is the same for each weapon:
whether its specific use complies with IHL.”5 Alston concludes that assessment of
each use of force to ensure compliance with the requirement of proportionality
must be made with respect to “each attack individually, and not for an overall mili-
tary operation.”6 He thus elides the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Each operates
in different contexts and with different understandings; treating them as one leads
to confusion, mistake of law and uncertainty. Recognizing that the proportionality
standard must be met for a use of force to be lawful and that the principle of dis-
crimination between military and civilian targets is at the core of the modern law of
armed conflict, Yoram Dinstein put it better than Alston: those who plan attacks
need to take into account the duty to minimize civilian casualties.7
Perhaps because his audience is the UN Human Rights Council and perhaps
because the focus of his own work is international human rights law, Alston looks at
uses of force with international human rights concerns foremost in his mind. (This
observation in no way suggests that I do not share his aspirations for a world that re-
spects and protects human rights.) Let us see what Alston does with his perspective.
First, he takes a more limited view than I suspect would be shared in this audito-
rium of what constitutes a legitimate target for killing in armed conflict: “‘combat-
ant’ or ‘fighter’ or, in the case of a civilian, only for such time as the person ‘directly
participates in hostilities.’”8 Alston states, without analysis,
It is not easy to arrive at a definition of direct participation that protects civilians and at
the same time does not “reward” an enemy that may fail to distinguish between civil-
ians and lawful military targets, that may deliberately hide among civilian populations
and put them at risk, or that may force civilians to engage in hostilities. The key, how-
ever, is to recognize that regardless of the enemy’s tactics, in order to protect the vast
majority of civilians, direct participation may only include conduct close to that of a
fighter, or conduct that directly supports combat. More attenuated acts, such as pro-
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Alston asserts that “direct participation” excludes activities that may support “the
general war effort,” e.g., “political advocacy, supplying food or shelter, or economic
support and propaganda.”10 He adopts what he calls the “farmer by day, fighter by
night”11 distinction to protect the daytime farmer from being a legitimate target.
Such an approach, which is included in Additional Protocol I12 (and one of the rea-
sons the United States is not a party), favors the terrorist. (My lawyer would have
me say “arguably favors.”) Alston prefers the guidance of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross with respect to direct participation in hostilities—it may
stop and start on a continuing basis. One becomes a legitimate target only when
engaged in a targetable activity.13 This is not a position that will win many advo-
cates among those engaged in combating terrorists and their attacks. Further, if his
goal is “to protect the vast majority of civilians,”14 then one might have thought he
would have emphasized the importance of suppressing terrorism. Thus, Alston’s
Report suffers by seeming not to take terrorism so seriously as governments and
publics do.
The UN Security Council has suggested that one take a broader view. In Resolu-
tion 1373, adopted following the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council “decided” that
all States shall
[e]nsure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and en-
sure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are estab-
lished as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts.15
While engaging in criminal support for terrorism may not per se make one a lawful
target, it does suggest that Alston is rather too quick to narrow the categories of
legitimate military targets. I assume that he would regard command and control,
training and supplying of materiel as putting one in the category of legitimate tar-
get, but the fact that he excludes financiers raises a question. By not evaluating the
impact of UN Security Council resolutions on his assumptions, Alston under-
mines the usefulness of his work.
Achieving a general definition of terrorism has bedeviled the international com-
munity. At the same time, through a series of UN Security Council resolutions and
multilateral treaties, the same community has narrowed the definitional gap for
disagreement about whether a particular act is, or is not, terrorist by defining acts
usually committed by terrorists as “terrorist.” Alston seems to define “terrorist” in
such a way as to make status severable, as Professor Harvey Rishikof likes to say.
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Thus, for Alston, the terrorist can be many things at once, each one separable from
the other, with different legal consequences for each.
Second, Alston’s emphasis on international human rights law in the fight
against terrorists creates a legal unreality for those who combat terrorism. UN Se-
curity Council resolutions are both more inclusive and more vague. Their language
reflects political compromises achieved through the drafting process, compro-
mises that allow unanimous adoption of counterterrorist resolutions. Thus, UN
Security Council resolutions routinely reaffirm
that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious
threats to international peace and security . . . [and] the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including
applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, threats to inter-
national peace and security caused by terrorist acts.16
Those engaged in combating terrorism can use this Security Council language as a
standard against which to evaluate plans. Alston’s failure to consider the impact of
Resolution 1373 and other Security Council counterterrorism resolutions limits
the operational utility of his work.
Alston insists that the laws of war and international human rights law apply in
the context of armed conflict without analyzing either how they do or the conse-
quences for military operations. Thus, Alston asserts, where the law of armed con-
flict is unclear or uncertain, “it is appropriate to draw guidance from human rights
law.”17 He does not specify the content of such law and whether, to the extent it de-
rives from treaties, all or just some States are parties. The same is true in his treat-
ment of the law of armed conflict as his references to the 1977 Geneva Additional
Protocols show.
Alston’s operational concern is procedural. He argues that, as a result of failing
to disclose the legal basis for individual targeting decisions and who has been killed
with what collateral consequences, “clear legal standards [have been displaced]
with a vaguely defined license to kill, and the creation of a major accountability
vacuum.”18 As Alston notes, targeted killings have taken place in a variety of con-
texts—Russia’s war in Chechnya, the US war with Al Qaeda, Sri Lanka’s war with
rebel groups, and Israel’s wars with Arab States, quasi-States and groups are a few
examples. Alston sums up the situation as follows:
Although in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in the excep-
tional circumstance of armed conflict, they may be legal. This is in contrast to other




C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:02 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
“extrajudicial execution,” “summary execution”, and “assassination”, all of which are,
by definition, illegal.19
This approach to conceptually distinct acts reflects a rush to conclusion based on in-
sufficient and imprecise analysis. The US official position, for example, is different.
The US View
Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Adviser, gave the Obama administration
position in a speech in March 2010 to the American Society of International Law.20
He made a number of significant points that assist in deciding who is and who is
not a lawful target. First, Mr. Koh said that the United States is engaged in a num-
ber of armed conflicts simultaneously: “In the conflict occurring in Afghanistan
and elsewhere, we continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/11: a non-state actor, al-
Qaeda (as well as the Taliban forces that harbored al-Qaeda).” With respect to tar-
geting, he stated, “U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted
with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including
the laws of war.”
With regard to the authority to use force, Mr. Koh stated, “As a matter of inter-
national law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the
Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use
force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law.” He
continued, “[I]n this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority
under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, includ-
ing lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level
al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks.” This point is important as all decisions
about targeting, the location of the conflict and treatment of prisoners flow from it.
Mr. Koh stated that the United States recognizes the applicability of the law of
armed conflict, and the core principles of distinction and proportionality. Target-
ing individuals who are legitimate military objectives, such as commanders, plan-
ners, supporters and the like, is within international law. Killing such persons is not
to deprive them of judicial due process, for none is due, and does not violate US
legal prohibitions on assassination for the same reason: legitimate and lawful acts
of self-defense are not crimes. Finally, Koh defends the use of unmanned vehicles
as increasing the precision of attacks and limiting collateral damage. In this respect,
Alston shares the US view.
The US position raises questions just as the Human Rights Council report does.
The question of the use of precision weapons is one such issue. What legal conse-
quences flow from possession of them? Do they affect the way a State, as a matter of
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law, must conduct military operations, including those in exercise of the inherent
right of self-defense codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter? Do precision weap-
ons eliminate recognition that error is endemic to warfare and mean that civilian
casualties, if they occur, must be intended (as the Goldstone Report suggests)?21
How does the requirement to distinguish between military and civilian targets af-
fect, if it does, the right to use force in self-defense when the State with the right
does not possess precision weapons, and its enemy hides among, or otherwise ex-
ploits, civilians?
These and other questions spring to mind in the course of studying the Alston
Report and such other Human Rights Council documents as the Goldstone Re-
port.22 Each of them raises more questions than it answers. Alston raises a further
issue: the status of Central Intelligence Agency officers engaging in armed conflict
with Al Qaeda and its allies. Do they, as Alston asserts, not enjoy combatant status
even if they meet the requirements of the Geneva Conventions? Should one distin-
guish between the CIA officer engaged in cloak and dagger and those who engage
in military operations and look and behave like the regular armed forces except for
the source of their paychecks?
Conclusion
We shall be discussing these and other issues in the next few days. Their impor-
tance to success in the effort to combat terrorism and terrorists is hard to overstate.
Other issues are significant as well. They include the fact, which seems often to be
forgotten, that the use of force is a political act aimed at political objectives. This is
true whether the goal is capitulation or change of policy. For the United States, the
goals invariably include persuading the adversary to comply with international legal
standards of behavior. At the same time, the tactical choices made also have politi-
cal consequences. These need to be considered as one goes forward with a use of
force. In addition, calls for the introduction of judicial process into military
decisions, not just the detention of prisoners, seem to be growing louder. Is such
involvement of the judiciary necessary or wise? And what are the consequences of
introducing judicial process as a routine part of military operations?
As the war with Al Qaeda and its associates continues with no end in sight and
with some groups pressing for criminal prosecutions of those fighting terrorists,
getting the analysis and argument right is a political and legal necessity. Professor
Alston’s Report is not wrong in every respect; neither is it right—therefore more
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